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SANCTIONING CORPORATIONS
Meir Dan-Cohen*
I. REFORMULATING THE QUESTION
The question this symposium invites us to discuss, ought
collective entities be criminally punished, arises in the intersection
between two sets of issues, ontological and normative. In order to
address this question, we must form some conception of what
collective entities are; this is the ontological challenge. And we
must form a conception of just or appropriate punishment; this is
the normative challenge. We would probably not be here today if
there were agreement on either of these matters, let alone if there
were agreement on both. In fact, there is none. The question we
address, though broadly discussed, remains highly contested. But
though the question receives conflicting answers, there is one point
of tacit agreement: that the question is properly posed. The very
disagreement as to whether collectivities should be criminally
punished attests to a shared premise that this question sets the
correct scholarly agenda, and that a positive or negative answer is
the desired goal. My starting point in this paper is to question the
question. By presenting us with a binary option this question forces
upon us a false dilemma that distorts the debate and induces
unwarranted, sometimes paradoxical consequences. Refusing the
question is the first step toward escaping the dilemma and
rectifying the terms of the debate to which it gives rise.
Though the question in question concerns collectivities in
general, like other participants in this symposium I focus for the
* Milo Reese Robbins Chair in Legal Ethics, University of California at
Berkeley School of Law. I’d like to thank Robert Leider for his research
assistance. This is an expanded version of a talk given on Feb. 5, 2010 at
Brooklyn Law School’s David G. Trager Public Policy Symposium on “Sharing
the Blame: The Law and Morality of Punishing Collective Entities.”
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most part on just one type of collectivity: the large corporation.1
(For the sake of brevity, from now on I omit the adjective.) This
selectivity is not adventitious. First, corporations form a
particularly salient and significant group of collective entities.
Secondly, they share some characteristics that make them a
distinctive and relatively homogenous type of collectivity.
Corporations are formal and instrumental collectivities. Formal, in
the sense that they have an elaborate and relatively well-defined
organizational structure, and instrumental in the sense that their
creation and maintenance is oriented toward the accomplishment
of certain goals seen as providing the corporation with legitimacy
and a raison d’être.2 My comments can be extended, with caution
and necessary adjustments, to various other collectivities that
resemble corporations in relevant respects. But though the
following discussion may thus have wider implications, I consider
directly only the narrower version of the question: should
corporations be criminally punished? For ease of reference I label
this the Question.
A. Two Assumptions
Two tacit assumptions regarding criminal punishment underlie
the Question: that such punishment is, first, a unitary category
which, secondly, derives its meaning from a paradigm case
involving individual offenders. Call these, respectively, the
assumption of unity and the assumption of individuality. The first
assumption is implicit in the single label used to designate the
practice under consideration. Only if this label stands for a
singular, unified practice, can the Question be meaningfully posed.
The second assumption is implicit in the challenge that
1

This designation combines the strictly legal notion of incorporation, i.e.,
being the bearer of legal rights and obligations, with the sociological notion of
an organization, which connotes structure and a certain level of complexity.
2
I distinguish corporations from other collectivities, most significantly
from communities, and draw some normative implications of the distinction in,
for example, Between Selves and Collectivities: Toward a Jurisprudence of
Identity, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1213, 1216, 1232, 1239–40 (1994), and Freedoms of
Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by Organizations,
Communities, and the State, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1229, 1230–31, 1244–58 (1991).
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collectivities supposedly present in this regard: punishing
corporations is perceived as extending a practice whose natural
domain is populated by individuals.
It is easy to see how these assumptions shape the debate. The
first defines its conceptual contours. Whether or not to punish
corporations is presented as a package-deal; we are asked to cast a
yes-or-no vote, as it were, on a single option, that of subjecting
corporations to an existing regime of criminal justice. The second
assumption dictates the normative tenor of the discussion: in order
to be punishable, corporations must be assimilated in one way or
another to the paradigmatic individual offenders, and so the
normative considerations and concerns that bear on punishing
corporations turn out to be those that bear on punishing
individuals. In light of these two assumptions, the dilemma to
which I alluded is clear: punishing corporations requires forcing
them, conceptually as well as normatively, into a pre-existing
Procrustean bed designed to accommodate a different type of
inhabitant; yet to refrain from punishing them is to exempt some
powerful agents, capable of great social harm, from a significant
instrument of social control.
The Assumption of Unity
When made explicit, both assumptions look shaky, and ways of
loosening their grip appear. Consider the assumption of unity first.
Criminal punishment consists of a variegated cluster of ideas and a
complex institutional structure. It is not made of whole cloth.
Nevertheless, treating it, with the aid of a single label, as an
undifferentiated unit, has great practical as well as intellectual
merit. Thinking, no less than practice, hinges on such composites
whose unity is for the most part taken for granted. Yet depending
on the goals we pursue or the nature of the investigation we
conduct, it is sometimes advisable to disaggregate a given
composite and refine the analysis by attending more closely to the
composite’s components. The legal treatment of corporations is a
sufficiently fundamental matter to call for such an approach.
Simply too much is at stake in this area for us to ignore the
heterogeneity and complexity of what criminal punishment
designates.
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Once we look at criminal punishment even through the feeblest
magnifying glass and subject it to the dullest scalpel, many
disparate elements spring into view and can be pried apart.
Criminal punishment is a form of centralized social control that
employs coercion, is initiated by the state, is rule-bound, is
judicially administered, and so forth. Each of these elements can be
in turn further unpacked: there is no algorithm for delimiting in
advance the level of detail that would best serve in a thorough
investigation of the kind the Question calls for. Judgment is
required to decide how fine grained our approach ought to be. The
Question, however, avoids such a judgment by hiding the
multiplicity of issues and options that arise in this area under the
terminological rug it blithely throws over them. When we peer
under the rug or remove it entirely, we are in a better position to
pick and choose among various elements in an effort to best adapt
the practice of punishment as designed for individual offenders to
the properties of the collectivities concerned.
The Assumption of Individuality
The effort to adjust criminal punishment to a corporate context
is also hampered by the second assumption underlying the
Question, the assumption of individuality. Conceiving of
individuals as the paradigmatic criminal offenders implies an
obvious criterion in light of which the Question must be answered:
corporations are punishable if and only if punishing them would
amount to or be the equivalent of punishing individual human
beings. There are two ways in which this criterion can be satisfied
in principle, and they correspond to the two main schools of
thought regarding the nature of collectivities, the holistic and the
reductionist. Roughly speaking, those I call holists affirm the
existence of collective entities over and above, as the saying goes,
their individual members.3 Reductionists, by contrast, maintain that
3

Holism, as used here, refers to a very large umbrella, under which a
heterogeneous range of views congregate. As an indication of this range, it may
be helpful to divide these views into three subcategories—call them the
notional, the epistemological, and the metaphysical—differing in the level of
“robustness” of the existence they claim for corporations, or, put differently, in
the size or nature of the gap they posit between individual members and the
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to talk about collective entities is to use a shorthand or indulge in a
fiction, and in either case is to designate nothing but the multitude
of individual agents and their interactions. Though the holistic and
the reductionist approaches to collectivities are, ontologically
speaking, polar opposites, their normative implications can,
perhaps somewhat surprisingly, converge. This is most likely to
happen when the holistic approach assumes, sometimes
unwittingly, an anthropomorphic mode. Whether the corporation is
envisaged by the holist as an individual-like entity or by the
reductionist as an aggregate of individuals, its legal treatment is
assimilated to the treatment appropriate for individual human
actors.
The inquiry concerning the punishment of corporations
accordingly assumes one of two forms. Seen from the holistic
perspective, the question is whether the collectivity as a whole is
similar enough to an individual agent so as to make the imposition
of punishment appropriate. Seen from the reductionist perspective,
the question is whether the individual members of the corporation
stand to the criminal actions ascribed to the corporation in a
relationship that legitimates punishing them. By moving the
investigation along either of these lines, the question whether
corporations ought to be criminally punished loads the dice in
favor of a negative answer. For the holists, advocating corporate
punishment requires that they identify in the corporation relevant
human properties that permit analogizing it to an individual; such

corporation. A notional view highlights the fact that a reified conception of the
corporation is deeply entrenched in our ordinary language and practices and
proceeds to ascribe normative significance to such entrenchment. An
epistemological view highlights the complexity of the network of relationships
constitutive of the corporation, maintaining that this creates an insurmountable
cognitive barrier for any attempt to account for the corporate phenomenon in
individual terms. This leaves open the possibility that such reduction is possible
“in principle.” The third, metaphysical view is distinguished by denying this last
claim, insisting instead (on various and sometimes conflicting grounds) that
corporations exhibit global properties that are not even in principle amenable to
an individualist reduction. I ignore these distinctions for the most part, treating
the holistic camp as unified, though a more thorough treatment of the issues
involved would explore links between these subcategories and the specific
arguments I make.
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theorists risk committing the notorious anthropomorphic fallacy.4
Reductionist advocates of corporate punishment find themselves
on an equally treacherous path: they in effect favor the imposition
of a form of collective punishment on a heterogeneous group of
people many of whom do not satisfy the requirements of
blameworthiness ordinarily required by criminal law. Attenuating
these requirements in the present context seems both dangerous
and ad hoc.
B. Sanctions and Constraints
In light of these daunting difficulties, it is no surprise that many
theorists embrace the negative horn of the dilemma created by the
Question, much as this position collides with a pre-theoretical
reluctance to let corporations off the criminal hook.5 Others resist
this conclusion, contriving instead an affirmative answer.6
However, these theorists too have been led astray by the Question
and fallen into what may be a less visible, but no less perilous,
trap. By resolving the dilemma in favor of corporate punishment,
these theorists are likely to view themselves as striking a blow
against corporate power and its abuses; they fashion themselves

4

For illustrative discussions of warnings to this effect, see ROBERT B.
REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF BUSINESS, DEMOCRACY,
AND EVERYDAY LIFE 218–19 (2007); John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No
Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate
Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 n.2, 390, 441, 448 (1981).
5
See, e.g., John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years
of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329 (2009); Joseph F.
Francis, Criminal Responsibility of the Corporation, 18 ILL. L. REV. 305, 314–
23 (1924); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it
Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996); Eliezer Lederman, Criminal Law,
Perpetrator and Corporation: Rethinking a Complex Triangle, 76 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 285 (1985); Manuel Velasquez, Debunking Corporate Moral
Responsibility, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 531, 538–40 (2003); see also 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *476–77.
6
See, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 833 (2000); Regina A. Robson, Crime
and Punishment: Rehabilitating Retribution as a Justification of Organizational
Criminal Liability, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 109 (2010); see also N.Y. Cent. & Hudson
River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–96 (1909).
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the black rather than the white knights of the corporate world. In
fact, the blow they strike may have just the opposite effect.
To see this paradoxical aspect of the present debate we must
return to the first assumption underlying the Question, concerning
the supposed unity of punishment. In contesting this assumption, I
have distinguished a number of disparate factors in the practice of
punishment. But for present purposes a binary division is all we
need. The most prominent and indeed a defining element in the
practice of criminal punishment is the sanction, by which I mean
the use of coercive power to affect conduct. But the practice of
punishment has an additional salient aspect: an unusually
restrictive system of constraints—substantive, procedural, and
evidentiary—to which the use of coercion is subject. The debate
concerning the punishment of corporations focuses on the first
element, the sanction, whereas the second element, the constraints,
is mostly taken for granted, and so remains invisible. An
affirmative answer to the Question accordingly involves not only a
recommendation that corporations be liable to sanction, but also a
further and usually undefended implication that once the state
imposes sanctions on a corporation, it is bound by the same
network of constraints that tie its hands when punishing
individuals.7
Once we depart from the unitary notion of criminal
punishment, and, specifically, distinguish between sanctions and
constraints, the Question whether corporations ought to be
criminally punished becomes bifurcated. First, ought corporations
be sanctioned, that is subject to the coercive enforcement of
criminal norms? Second, ought the sanctioning of corporations be
bound by criminal law’s strict constraints? In the next section I
argue for an affirmative answer to the first question, and in the
following section, for a negative answer to the second. In the final
section I sketch some further implications of the view I advocate.

7

With occasional exceptions; see, e.g., Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201,
206 (1988) (privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to corporations).
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II. IN FAVOR OF SANCTIONS
A. A Theory of Punishment
The two questions just distinguished can only be pursued in
light of the answers we give to more preliminary ones that reach to
the fundamentals of criminal law theory: Why does the criminal
law impose sanctions? Why does it employ constraints? Though
this is a highly contested area, I will proceed with an approach to
punishment that enjoys considerable support. The justification of
punishment on this account is an interplay between deterrence and
retribution, and correspondingly, between a consequentialist,
mostly utilitarian strand, and a deontological, mostly Kantian
strand, each respectively answering one of the preliminary
questions. According to this familiar story, criminal law’s coercive
threats are designed to promote some social goals or values. But
these goals and values set necessary but insufficient conditions for
imposing punishment. The reason is that we can imagine situations
in which punishment would serve its legitimating purposes when
imposed on someone who is innocent of any wrongdoing,8 and yet
punishing the innocent even in those situations would be a moral
outrage. But why? Seen in consequentialist terms, the answer is far
from obvious; the opposition to punishing the innocent rests more
securely on broadly Kantian grounds. Punishing the innocent, even
in the service of some desirable goals, amounts to treating an
individual as a means rather than as an end, in violation of the
Categorical Imperative, and so is offensive to human dignity.9 The
retributive aspect of punishment ensures that punishment be
limited to the blameworthy, thereby adding a necessary moral
permission to the consequentialist reasons that support coercion in
8

This could be the case, for example, when punishment is imposed on the
wrong person by mistake, or through deliberate framing. In either case, the
deterrent efficacy of the sanction remains undiminished as long as people
believe in the defendant’s guilt.
9
In the formulation most relevant here, the Categorical Imperative states:
“Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person
or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same
time as an end.” IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF
MORALS 91 (H. J. Paton trans., 1948).
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the first place.10
To be sure, the line between the two sets of reasons that bear
on punishment—deterrence-related consequentialist goals and
retribution-related deontological side-constraints—is not welldefined. The constraints consist primarily in the various elements
of blameworthiness which substantive criminal law requires, and
which evidentiary and procedural standards help safeguard.
However, some level of wrongdoing, and thus arguably some form
of blameworthiness, is implicit in the imperative of deterrence
itself: random sanctions would make for a poor deterrent. The
imperatives of deterrence therefore link sanctions to wrongdoing in
ways that resemble the retributive side-constraints. But although
the line between such “internal” limitations on sanctions on the one
side and their extraneous, deontological constraints on the other is
blurred, it is not obliterated, for two reasons. First, deterrence only
requires an attenuated level of wrongdoing, arguably to the point
of altogether dispensing with the subjective elements of crime, and
correlatively with most of criminal law’s defenses.11 Consequently,
much, if not quite all, of what substantive criminal law demands by
way of blameworthiness must be explained by appeal to
10

This account is sometimes referred to as the mixed or hybrid theory of
punishment. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and Justification, 118
ETHICS 258, 258–59 (2008). An early, classical version is H. L. A. Hart,
Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in 60 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 1 (1959–60). See also JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L.
COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 117–24
(rev. ed., Westview Press 1990) (1984). Seen in this way, punishment is a
special case of what has become a pervasive liberal template, in which the
normative test for various institutions and practices combines consequentialist
and deontological elements: consequentialist considerations define the goal of
the institution or the practice, but the pursuit of this goal is subject to
deontological side-constraints, designed to safeguard individuals and their rights
from being unjustly sacrificed on society’s altar. The canonical texts are
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977), especially chapters 4, 7,
and 12, and ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26–53 (1974). For
an illuminating overview, see SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF
CONSEQUENTIALISM (rev. ed. 1994) (1982). For a book-length study of the
application of this template to various areas of law, see EYAL ZAMIR & BARAK
MEDINA, LAW, ECONOMICS, AND MORALITY (2010).
11
See, e.g., Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law,
12 STAN. L. REV. 731 (1960).
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considerations that go beyond the imperatives of deterrence and so
amounts to external constraints. Second, evincing a heightened
anxiety lest an innocent defendant be punished, the evidentiary and
procedural strictures of the criminal trial amplify and fortify these
substantive constraints by erecting on the road to conviction some
formidable obstacles which exceed what pure consequentialist
considerations would mandate.12
B. Practical Personality
How does this account of criminal punishment bear on
corporations? It will facilitate the discussion if at the outset we
distinguish between, on the one hand, the conditions an entity must
satisfy to be a proper object of the consequentialist considerations
that buttress sanctions, and on the other, the conditions for it to be
an object of the deontological concerns that buttress the sideconstraints. To mark the distinction, I’ll associate the former
conditions with the possession of what I call practical personality,
and the latter with the possession of moral personality. The
distinction as drawn at this point is purely formal; it does not
prejudice the inquiry as to what is the relationship between the two
sets of conditions. Some writers in effect maintain that they
overlap, or that one entails the other.13 I argue that they do not.
The notion of practical personality is designed to answer the
question of whether applying sanctions to an entity makes sense.
Specifically, it spells out the preconditions for using coercive
power as a measure of control with respect to corporations. For
12

See, e.g., Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 27 (1964) (“[People] have to be prepared to pay a price for a
regime that fosters personal privacy and champions the dignity and inviolability
of the individual. That price inevitably involves some sacrifice in efficiency
. . . .”); see also Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal
Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J.
185, 201–02 (1983) (noting the value of Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections
apart from their contributions to producing efficient and accurate results in
criminal trials); Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process: Toward a More
Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 117–25
(1978) (finding the dignity of the individual to be a basic value underlying the
due process required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
13
See sources cited infra note 25.
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such measures to be potentially effective, and so for the imposition
of sanctions on the corporation to be sound, it must be possible to
ascribe to the corporation as a whole, that is at a global, nondistributive level, (1) patterns of behavior and consequences, (2)
that are amenable to change by means of the coercive measures
employed. This in turn requires that we be able to ascribe to the
corporation causal efficacy, displayed in such performances as
manufacturing widgets or polluting the environment, as well as
some cognitive faculties. These faculties must include some form
of instrumental rationality, manifested as much in the harnessing of
the corporation’s causal powers to the pursuit of some goals, as in
responsiveness to norms and to threats that back them up. For such
threats to have a bite, all that is required in turn is that they involve
representations of actions designed to thwart in one way or another
the corporation’s pursuit of its guiding goals, and so be perceived
as a setback to what can be labeled the corporation’s interests.
It is at least plausible to maintain that corporations display
practical personality in this sense. Our ordinary ways of talking
about corporations and a host of practices and attitudes regarding
corporations take some such picture for granted. These ways of
talking, practices, and attitudes find support in the kinds of
considerations put forward by more systematic and reflective
accounts of corporations within organization theory broadly
conceived. Though this is not the place to canvass this extensive
literature, its gist as it bears on the issue at hand can be briefly
indicated.
Organization theorists characterize formal organizations most
frequently by the presence of a decision-making process. The idea
of decision making implies the capacity to perform such functions
as gathering, registering, recording, decoding, and disseminating
information. These information-related functions are generally
imputed to the organization, rather than to specific individuals,
because the total information that leads to a certain decision,
action, or product is not normally possessed by any single
individual, nor is it just the combined knowledge possessed by a
number of identifiable individuals. Instead, what information is
gathered, to whom it is disseminated, how it is decoded, and how it
is combined and brought to bear on the final outcome critically
depend on the structure of the organization, on the presence or
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absence of particular units or positions in it, and on the relevant
standard operating procedures.14 Furthermore, in speaking of an
organizational decision we presuppose the existence of some
organizational preferences, which lend a certain unity and
intelligibility to the pattern of events we think of as corporate
behavior. Here, too, it is sensible to impute preferences to the
organization itself, since its decisions need not be a direct
reflection of any underlying pattern of individual preferences. For
example, a coalition view depicts organizational decision making
as a bargaining process among various groups with divergent and
often conflicting interests. Decisions are accordingly characterized
as the “political resultants”15 of these complex bargains, achieved
in part by logrolling and strategic behavior. Social choice theory
articulates more generally the obstacles, both practical and
conceptual, to aggregating individual preferences into a collectively rational choice.16 Portraying organizations as “intentional
systems”17 possessed of “organizational intelligence”18 are cogent
ways of expressing the view that organizations make decisions
14

See, for example, ROBERT H. BONCZEK, CLYDE W. HOLSAPPLE &
ANDREW B. WHINSTON, FOUNDATIONS OF DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS (1981),
for the role and nature of information processing in organizations.
15
See GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 162 (1971):
[R]esultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution
to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict, and
confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence;
political in the sense that the activity from which decisions and actions
emerge is best characterized as bargaining along regularized channels
among individual members of the [organization].
16
See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES
3–4 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2d ed. 1963) (1951); R. DUNCAN LUCE &
HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 327–70 (1957); THOMAS SCHELLING,
MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1978). See Philip Pettit, Responsibility
Incorporated, 117 ETHICS 171, 180–84 (2007), for a recent version of this line
of reasoning applied to the question of corporate personality.
17
See Daniel Dennett, Conditions of Personhood, in BRAINSTORMS:
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON MIND AND PSYCHOLOGY 267, 271 (1978) (defining
intentional systems as systems or organisms whose behavior can be explained
by reference to beliefs, desires, and intentions).
18
See HAROLD L. WILENSKY, ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCE:
KNOWLEDGE AND POLICY IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY (1967).
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infused with cognitive content, that are the product of widely
dispersed informational sources and diffuse individual interests
and attitudes, all mediated by structures, processes, and chance, in
ways that defy translating or tracing the organizational decision
into its individual sources. By thus spelling out the grounds for
imputing global properties to organizations, the considerations I
have sketched serve to reassure us that the ordinary reifying
language we commonly apply to organizations need not depend on
a metaphorical personification nor on some far-reaching
metaphysical commitments. The position these considerations
support can be instead summarized as holding that whereas a
corporation is constituted by a bunch of individuals, it is not
identical with them, since constitution, in this case, is not
identity.19
C. Why Sanction
The notion of practical personality is designed to capture
conditions that support sanctioning an entity exhibiting it. Thus the
case just made for ascribing practical personality to corporations is
ipso facto also a case for subjecting them to sanctions. Even so,
and in light of the pervasiveness of a contrary view, it may be
helpful to spell out the link between the corporation’s practical
personality and the argument for sanctions a bit more fully. This
link consists in two complementary claims: that sanctioning
corporations is potentially needed and that it is potentially
efficacious. Both the need and the efficacy depend on a dual
distinction, implicit in the notion of practical personality, between,
first, distributive and non-distributive corporate acts, and
correspondingly, between distributive and non-distributive effects
on the corporation.
19

The difference between constitution and identity is most commonly
illustrated by the alleged difference between a clay statue and the lump of clay
of which it is made: for example, the statue can be destroyed without the lump
of clay being destroyed. For a discussion of some of the issues involved in
regard to the identity of material objects, see generally Lynne Rudder Baker,
Why Constitution is Not Identity, 94 J. PHIL. 599 (1997). It probably goes
without saying that this doctrine is contested in the case of material objects no
less than in the case of corporations to which I extend it.
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By distributive acts I mean acts which, though ascribed to the
corporation, are performed by some identifiable individuals; nondistributive acts are corporate acts which are not traceable or
reducible to the acts of particular individuals. The word
“identifiable” and the equivocation between traceable and
reducible signify a difference between a weaker and a stronger
interpretation of non-distributive acts. The stronger interpretation
denies that a corporation’s manufacturing widgets, or for that
matter, polluting the environment, can in all cases be accounted for
in terms of individual actions even in principle. The weaker
interpretation points to the complexity and opacity of the
corporation as posing a practical obstacle to tracing corporate acts
to their individual constituents, rendering such tracing too costly or
otherwise impracticable even if possible in theory.20 Similar
remarks apply to the effects of actions putatively directed toward
the corporation. Such actions will have distributive effects when
the effects are traceable or reducible to some particular individuals,
and non-distributive effects otherwise.
Non-distributive corporate acts indicate the need for
enforcement measures addressed to the corporation, since they
reveal a gap between controlling through punishment the conduct
of particular individuals on the one hand, and a modification of the
corporation’s conduct on the other. Without sanctioning the
corporation, we face therefore an accountability and enforcement
deficit. But this is only half the case for sanctioning corporations.
The fact that there is a gap does not mean that ways of filling it
exist, and in particular that corporate sanctions would avail. The
other half of the argument accordingly concerns the likely efficacy
of imposing sanctions on the corporation.
Here the notion of non-distributive effects comes into play.
Corporate sanctions are distinguished precisely by the fact that
they are intended to have negative effects on the corporation as
such, rather than on any particular individuals. How are such nondistributive effects on the corporation likely to modify its conduct?
In answering this question, it is helpful to distinguish three
mechanisms of control that can be subsumed under the general
heading of deterrence. I will call them respectively direct
20

See supra note 3.
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deterrence, indirect deterrence, and mediated deterrence. Direct
deterrence designates the most common, garden-variety form of
deterrence in which the sanction is designed to influence the
decisions and so directly modify the conduct of its intended object;
the target of the sanction21 and the object of control coincide. In
the two other forms of control, these diverge. Indirect deterrence
occurs when, due to some special relationship between the target
of sanction and the object of control, addressing a sanction to the
one will influence the decisions of the other; for example, when the
abduction of a politician by a radical group is designed to put
pressure on the government, not on the captured politician. In
mediated deterrence, the target of the sanction holds a position of
power over the object of control or is otherwise able to modify the
latter’s behavior. Here, the sanction is intended to impact its
immediate target, but only so as to induce actions that will in turn
influence the ultimate object of control, such as when holding
parents responsible for the misdeeds of their children is intended to
induce parental control over the children’s behavior.
Evidently, all three mechanisms of control have a grip in the
case of corporations and can be expected to exert influence on their
performance. Sanctioning the corporation involves direct
deterrence when we envisage the sanction, in impersonal terms, as
a “disturbing event” in the corporation’s environment which serves
to alert its decision making process to the existence of a certain
dysfunction, triggering some standard operating procedure into
taking remedial action consisting in some structural or systemic
changes like modifying the communication network, introducing
hitherto non-existent operations, etc.22
Additionally, and despite the non-distributive effects of
corporate sanctions, both indirect and mediated deterrence provide
viable strategies for influencing some (unidentified) individuals as
a way of affecting corporate behavior. Indirect deterrence takes
place when, whether out of loyalty or self-interest, members of the
corporation respond to the harm to the corporation represented by
21

This refers to the entity to which the threat of sanction is directed and on
which the sanction is actually imposed in case of breach.
22
This description draws particularly on the depiction of organizational
behavior in RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY
OF THE FIRM (2d ed., Blackwell Publ’g Inc. 1992) (1963).
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sanctions. Their response may amount to or bring about a change
in the corporation’s behavior. Mediated deterrence reverses this
direction of influence, which in this case runs from the corporation
to its individual members. A corporation may react to sanctions by
seeking to identify responsible individuals and take remedial action
addressed to them.23
III. AGAINST CONSTRAINTS
A. No Moral Personality
But if corporations have practical personality, and so are
amenable to sanctions, do they not have moral personality as well?
The notion of moral personality as I use it here is specifically
designed to capture the conditions by virtue of which the
imposition of sanction ought to be subject to the criminal law’s
battery of constraints. On the conception of criminal punishment I
have adumbrated, these constraints protect human dignity. To ask
whether corporations have moral personality is accordingly to
inquire whether the idea of human dignity extends to them.
Though when posed in this way the question may seem absurd, a
rather straightforward line of reasoning would seem to lead to a
positive answer. And though no one I know defends explicitly
ascribing dignity to corporations,24 some writers come close.
Following a vaguely Kantian line, they assume that the kinds of
properties I associate with practical personality—a capacity for
unified action and for rational decision making—constitute
people’s moral personality as well. Once it is realized that
corporations display these properties, they too must be recognized

23

This mechanism of deterrence is particularly emphasized in BRENT FISSE
& JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND ACCOUNTABILITY 32–34
(1993).
24
With perhaps one prominent exception, Jeremy Waldron, who has
recently advocated ascribing dignity to collectivities of various kinds. See
Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Groups, 2008 ACTA JURIDICA 66, 74–90
(2008). But I am not sure that even he means to include business corporations.
At any rate, his concept of dignity derives from the notion of high social rank,
and so is quite different from the Kantian notion of dignity on which I rely.
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as moral persons.25 Those who pursue this line of reasoning are
often concerned with securing a basis for holding corporations
responsible for harms they inflict, but the implicit result is to credit
them with dignity as well, thus unwittingly extending to them the
cluster of rights and protections that this idea entails.26 Can we do
better than that? Can we deny corporations the supreme moral
worth that the idea of dignity designates, while holding them
answerable for harmful acts? To explore this possibility we need
take a closer look at the relationship between practical and moral
personality. Does the one entail the other?
The negative answer I urge tackles what may appear as the
most innocuous link in the chain of reasoning just outlined. It is an
assumption not primarily about the ascription of moral personality
to corporations, but more basically about the moral personality of
human beings, to whom corporations are in turn compared.
According to this assumption, unless the ascription to human
beings of supreme moral worth is grounded in a suitable list of
abstractly conceived characteristics, such ascription must be
deemed arbitrary and self-serving, betraying merely a “traditional
prejudice in favor of biological persons.”27 From this it seems to
follow that in order to provide human dignity with the supposedly
requisite foundation, we must start by composing a list of
characteristics that would provide rational support for attributing
dignity to their bearers. The items I subsumed under the label of
practical personality are plausible candidates for such a list. The
crunch, however, is that once we follow this strategy and compose
a schedule of dignity-conferring traits, it becomes an open question
of fact which entities display these traits and answer to the
25

For widely ranging variants of this theme, see, for example, T. Ozar, The
Moral Responsibility of Corporations, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN BUSINESS: A
PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH 294, 294–99 (Thomas Donaldson & Patricia
Werhane eds., 1979), Thomas Donaldson, Moral Agency and Corporations, 10
PHIL. IN CONTEXT 54 (1980), Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral
Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207 (1979), and Pettit, supra note 16.
26
For a similar caveat, see Manuel G. Velasquez, Why Corporations are
not Morally Responsible for Anything They Do, 2 BUS. & PROF. ETHICS 1, 1–18
(1983).
27
PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 34
(1984).
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description they constitute. Individual human beings by and large
turn out to qualify (though some may not!), but in principle so can
other entities, corporations included.
This line of reasoning, common though it is, has things in
reverse. Practical personality, as I use this notion, is indeed a
descriptive category. Whether an entity possesses it can be
established by observation and study, even if what is being
observed and studied is at bottom a cluster of human practices,
discursive or otherwise. Ascribing to people moral personality, i.e.,
an unconditional and inviolable worth, is an altogether different
idea. For those who adhere to it, it defines the core of their
humanism and serves as their most fundamental normative
premise; it is not the conclusion of a train of reasoning but its
starting point. And insofar as human dignity is seen as the
cornerstone or starting point of a normative system, it cannot be
read off, and in this sense grounded in, a configuration of empirical
facts. The moral worth of human beings is immune to an
investigation into which entities possess some abstractly conceived
dignity-conferring traits, since it is not in the first place the product
of such an investigation. By the same token, it is not an open
question whether entities other than human beings may be found to
possess these traits. In particular, it is not as though staring long
and hard at corporations and studying them with care might reveal
them to have the supreme moral worth with which at least a liberal
creed invests individual human beings.28 This kind of
anthropomorphic fallacy would not be just a factual error, but
would involve a category mistake.29
28

Would intelligent Martians be potentially endowed with dignity? In
contemplating such hypothetical possibilities, we imagine the Martians to be in
effect human. What exactly “in effect” amounts to, however, need not be spelled
out before the Martians land, and as long as human beings are the only
candidates for moral personhood as here understood.
29
Category mistakes occur when a person “represents the facts of mental
life as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or
categories), when they actually belong to another.” GILBERT RYLE, THE
CONCEPT OF MIND 16 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2000) (1949). The risk of
committing the fallacy in the present context is vividly conveyed in the title,
though not the content, of Susanna Kim Ripken’s article, Corporations Are
People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to the Corporate Personhood
Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97 (2009).
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The mistake against which I inveigh is often committed in
Kant’s own name. Doesn’t he hold that moral personality, and so
dignity, issue from a capacity for autonomy, one that closely
resembles practical personality as I use the term? And isn’t this
capacity an empirical trait, that some creatures display and others
lack? We are of course not bound to follow Kant every step of the
way, but it is important to raise a red flag against common
aberrations that result from following him only part of it. In
holding that autonomy grounds dignity, we should be careful to
distinguish autonomy in Kant’s own transcendental sense, from an
empirical sense in which autonomy designates some observable
human psychological capabilities, which though supposedly more
advanced and sophisticated, are nonetheless of the same kind as
those displayed by many other creatures, be it computers or
giraffes.30 After all, one of the main points of the idiom of dignity
as used by Kant is to deny that people’s value can be placed in the
same metric as the value of anything else.31 The role of human
beings in a Kantian axiology is not in the first place as the objects
of valuation but as its subjects, as the creators and origins of value.
This is a complex idea to which we cannot hope to do justice in
this space, but the crux of the matter may perhaps be stated as
follows. The most distinctive human accomplishment is the
creation of a world: the projection of a system of categories or
meanings within which facts become intelligible and evaluative
judgments possible. People’s own supreme worth is not itself the
product of this projection but its precondition. It is a necessary
presupposition of the validity or objectivity that we claim for the
normative orders we inhabit. This is the sense in which human
beings are all the exclusive parties to a unitary and comprehensive
system of meanings, members, in Kant’s uplifting imagery, in the
“Kingdom of Ends.”32
Once a system of categories, concepts, values and the like is in
30

See KANT, supra note 9.
Though Kant does talk about a seemingly broader category, of rational
beings, people are the only terrestrial beings it comprises. See id.
32
See id. at 95. To be sure, the meanings are often contested, but crucially,
the contestation is in principle always possible, underwritten by the unity and
comprehensiveness of the system of meanings within which it takes place.
Needless to say, Kant’s universalism is itself highly contested.
31
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place, it makes room for, among many other things, human beings,
seen as empirical objects of observation. And as the observation of
human beings reveals, they do generally display the kinds of traits
I’ve associated with the notion of practical personality, and so are
the proper objects of control through sanction. But a crucial
difference between their practical and moral personality remains.
Practical personality is variable and contingent, whereas moral
personality is unitary and categorical. People differ in their level of
rationality and agency, and some display such capacities only
marginally or not at all. Similar variation occurs intra-personally as
well; the capacities in question fluctuate, and are occasionally
extinguished, as during sleep or a coma. These variations impact
the appropriateness of sanctions. But none of this affects the
person’s dignity and the respect it mandates. To be sure, the
apposite manifestation of respect is sensitive to a person’s state and
capacities. For example, though respect ordinarily requires
deference to a person’s self-regarding choices, this requirement is
moot in the case of someone who can’t make any. But whatever
the requisite manifestation of respect, the underlying value,
dignity, is possessed by all human beings fully, equally, and
uninterruptedly.33
The implications of this picture for the question at hand are
clear. If deontological constraints in general, and those of the
criminal law in particular, are tied to human dignity, the possibility
that they should extend to corporations, seen as entities in their
own right, is foreclosed from the start.34 Moreover, this conclusion
is consistent with ascribing to the corporation, on the basis of
observation and study, a practical personality, sufficient to justify
33

It may be felt that tying the notion of moral personality to the possession
of dignity commits us to an overly individualistic moral outlook. But how
individualistic the outlook is depends on the conception of human beings we
espouse, and in particular on the role of various collective affiliations in fixing
their identities. Exploring the difficult issues that this raises lies outside the
present topic.
34
This does not suggest, of course, that the government’s power over
corporations is unlimited. The point is only that such limitations as do apply
must have a consequentialist, perhaps utilitarian basis, and at any rate cannot be
extended wholesale and as a matter of course from the individual-oriented
arrangements of ordinary criminal law.
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the sanctioning of corporations in order to enforce desirable norms
of conduct and improve corporate performance.
B. Effects on Members
But even if corporations are not identical with or reducible to
the aggregate of their individual members, sanctioning
corporations will have predictably negative effects on their
members, whether shareholders or other stakeholders. Does not
sanctioning the corporation amount to sanctioning the members as
well, thus reinstating on the members’ behalf the need for the
battery of side-constraints that punishing individuals requires?
True, the nominal defendant in a corporate criminal trial is the
corporation, rather than any designated individuals. But isn’t
ignoring the individual ramifications of the sanction to take this
formality way too seriously, and to ascribe to the corporate veil
magical powers?
To respond to these worries, we need to place them within a
wider context by probing a bit further our earlier account of
punishment. We saw that the imposition of sanctions threatens
human dignity, and so calls for a particularly stringent battery of
constraints. But why exactly is this the case? What precisely is it
about criminal sanctions that provokes this anxiety and this
response? A simple answer fixes on the obvious: criminal
sanctions involve severe deprivations of people and a serious
setback to their interests. Unless justified in a way consonant with
the defendants’ moral standing as ends in themselves, such
deprivations are morally reprehensible. But a moment’s reflection
reveals the inadequacy of this simple answer. Two puzzles are
particularly relevant. First, many other governmental practices—
taxation, civil damages, military conscription, and fiscal policy—
often involve similar deprivations, and yet none of them is as
morally traumatic as the practice of punishment, nor are they
restricted by a corresponding armory of constraints. The second
puzzle concerns the way the effects of the sanctions themselves are
assessed. Punishment frequently has negative ramifications that go
beyond the particular defendant, impacting, sometimes severely,
the defendant’s family and others. Nevertheless, the law draws a
sharp line between the effects of punishment on the defendant and
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its effects on other parties. While going to extraordinary length to
safeguard that the defendant is indeed guilty of the crime charged,
the law condones with near equanimity any indirect harm to other
innocent parties.
The Argument from Stigma
If the simple answer does not adequately explain the special
solicitude toward criminal sanctions, what does? I consider two
alternatives. According to the first, a distinguishing mark of
criminal punishment is its link to moral turpitude and so to
stigma.35 The main point of criminal law’s special safeguards is
accordingly to protect individuals against an unwarranted
stigmatization, and so against a particularly invidious insult to their
dignity. If sound, this answer solves both puzzles: it explains the
greater moral concern with punishment over other modes of
governmental deprivation which do not carry such invidious
implications, as well as the almost exclusive focus on the
sanction’s effects on the defendant. This answer also upholds the
conclusion that sanctioning corporations need not be attended by
criminal law’s usual constraints, since it involves the
stigmatization of no particular individual, and so threatens no one’s
dignity.
The argument from stigma seems to me right as far as it goes,
but for our purposes it does not go far enough, for two reasons.
First, not all criminal punishment need involve stigma. For
example, it is at least debatable whether all mala prohibita offenses
stigmatize. And governments may seek to enforce unjustifiable
norms whose violation need not be associated with moral turpitude
of any kind. Yet surely such employments of criminal sanctions do
not exempt their users from the strictures that bind them in the case
of more paradigmatic crimes. Second, for present purposes, the
answer under consideration focuses on the wrong aspect of the
35

See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in
DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95, 98
(1970); Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal
Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 437
(1963) (“The central distinguishing aspect of the criminal sanction appears to be
the stigmatization of the morally culpable.”).
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criminal trial. Strictly speaking, the sanction itself does not
stigmatize. Stigma attaches to the defendant by virtue of the
conviction, the official pronouncement of guilt. If stigma were the
main concern, it would appear that criminal law’s constraints
would remain unaffected even in the absence of any sanction
following conviction. At least within the present understanding of
criminal law, this is not a plausible conclusion to reach.
The Argument from Mistreatment
These considerations require that we move beyond stigma, and
consider a second alternative. Since stigma depends on the content
of the norms whose alleged violation is the basis for the sanction,
in moving beyond stigma we must detach the special moral
concern raised by criminal sanctions from the norms which the
sanctions are designed to enforce. The aim is to reveal some formal
characteristics of criminal sanctions that explain their special moral
significance and so the constraints to which they are subject. My
suggestion is that punishment is an instance of a kind of
deprivation I call mistreatment, and that deprivations of this kind
carry a particularly heavy moral weight. By mistreatment I mean a
deliberate singling out of an individual for the sake of a severe
deprivation.36 In the remainder of this section I clarify and
substantiate three claims: that criminal sanctions ordinarily exhibit
these characteristics to a high degree; that this accounts for the
law’s special solicitude and the rigid constraints; and that
sanctioning corporations, though likely resulting in some
deprivations being inflicted on individuals, does not involve these
individuals’ mistreatment, and so ought to be exempt from the
constraints.
It is easy to see that unlike other deprivations wrought by
government action, criminal punishment presents an unambiguous
36

All the elements in this definition are continua and can come in various
versions and in different degrees. In particular, one can “single out” in the
relevant sense a group of individuals, when one targets an identity-fixing, e.g.,
ethnic or racial, property common to its members. It is significant therefore that
membership in a corporation (as, say, that of its shareholders) is not identityfixing, nor is the membership defined in terms of some other identity-fixing
characteristic.
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case of mistreatment. The deleterious effects of a fiscal policy on
employment, for example, can be accidental and unforeseen,
whereas the deprivation involved in punishment is the product of a
prolonged process of deliberation. Unlike taxation, which usually
affects anonymous groups of individuals in an impersonal way,
punishment focuses on a particular defendant, singling her out for
a severe deprivation. Unlike quarantine, which may in principle be
conducted in a five-star hotel, deprivation is the acknowledged
purpose of punishment, not just a regrettable side-effect. Finally,
criminal punishment involves particularly harsh deprivations. In
noting this last feature, it is also noteworthy how this harshness is
commonly assessed. The perception that punishment involves
severe deprivations does not depend on its aggregate but rather on
its distributive effects. If we were to assess the harshness of capital
punishment, for instance, in aggregate terms and rank it among the
various causes of death, it would probably not be of such great
social and political moment; the number of people who actually die
by execution is, statistically speaking, quite small. This fact does
not, however, diminish our concern with capital punishment, since
we deem it the most severe deprivation imposed on a particular
individual. Here too there is a contrast with the way other forms of
governmental deprivation are evaluated, e.g., the increase in road
fatalities when, say, the speed limit is raised.
But why does it matter that punishment fits my definition of
mistreatment? Why do the various elements conjoined in this
notion cohere, aggravating the negative moral significance of a
deprivation that exhibits them? Start by noting that this
combination of factors is not unique to criminal punishment, and
so is not ad hoc; rather, these factors characterize serious criminal
offenses as well. Consider first-degree murder. Its heinousness is
based in the first place on the judgment that it involves the
infliction of a most grievous deprivation. Note also that this
judgment looks exclusively at the effects on the victim. In placing
murder above, say, robbery, and at the top of the severity list, we
do not take into account the incidence of the two crimes to
determine which is more socially harmful in the aggregate; we
compare only the two felonies’ distributive effects. Furthermore,
the murderer targets an individual victim, whose death must be the
offender’s conscious objective rather than just a foreseeable side-
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effect of her action; and the action must be the product of
“premeditation and deliberation,” which marks it as more
reprehensible than, say, reckless killing. In short, first-degree
murder (and to a varying degree other core crimes) is an instance
of mistreatment; our moral intuitions and the law’s attitude are
aligned with the factors I have listed. Why?
The answer I propose links up with the Kantian themes I
pursued before. Morality, and correspondingly criminal law, insist
that our behavior express due respect for each person’s supreme
moral worth.37 The various elements of mistreatment provide
criteria for judging the extent to which behavior fails to be
respectful of the other and instead conveys reprehensible disregard.
By inflicting a severe deprivation on a particular individual one
exhibits a lack of respect for her. By judging the severity of the
deprivation exclusively in terms of the effects on the victim rather
than in aggregate societal terms we signal our commitment to the
unique value of the individual and her incomparable worth.38
Making the destruction of the other’s interests one’s affirmative
goal is the epitome of disrespect: one enacts a conception of the
victim as a mere means, someone whose own rights and interests
can be trampled at will.39 And by doing all of this deliberately, one
37

Cf. Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 123, 133
(1972):
The view that it can be wrong to consider merely the overall effect of
one’s actions on the general welfare comes into prominence when those
actions involve relations with others. A man’s acts usually affect more
people than he deals with directly, and those effects must naturally be
considered in his decisions. But if there are special principles governing
the manner in which he should treat people, that will require special
attention to the particular persons toward whom the act is directed,
rather than just to its total effect.
38
In stark contrast with utilitarianism’s summation of effects on
individuals, out of a concern for the sum total of such effects. See, e.g.,
CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 33–34 (1978); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 22–27 (1971).
39
The distinction between the intended results and the unintended sideeffects of one’s actions has a long pedigree in Western moral philosophy,
leading back to the Catholic doctrine of double effect. See, e.g., T.A.
CAVANAUGH, DOUBLE-EFFECT REASONING: DOING GOOD AND AVOIDING EVIL
(2006); THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT: PHILOSOPHERS DEBATE A
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invests one’s actions with their full negative meaning, leaving no
room for doubt about the disrespectful attitude they convey.40
As these comments suggest, the formal characteristics of
criminal sanctions parallel the formal characteristics of crime.
Deliberately singling out a particular individual for the sake of
inflicting on her a severe deprivation is a grave moral matter.
Classifying sanctions as a case of mistreatment thus helps us
appreciate the moral anxiety they produce. This account provides a
straightforward answer to the puzzles regarding punishment we
have raised, concerning the law’s greater solicitude toward
criminal sanctions compared to other forms of government
generated deprivations, and the law’s radically different attitude
toward the sanction’s effects on the defendant as against its effects
on other parties. Being a form of mistreatment, criminal sanctions
pose a greater threat to human dignity than other deprivations, and
the person whose dignity is thus at stake is the defendant on whom
the sanction is visited, not anyone else. The battery of constraints
created by criminal law is designed to mitigate this threat by
ensuring, as much as possible, that the defendant is justly treated
rather than being the victim of the equivalent of a crime.41
CONTROVERSIAL MORAL PRINCIPLE (P.A. Woodward ed., 2001).
40
The interpretation of first degree murder, and by extension of other core
criminal offenses, as instances of mistreatment, implies that blameworthiness is
here intrinsic to what the law aims to prevent, and not just an external constraint.
See generally Benjamin B. Sendor, Crime as Communication: An Interpretive
Theory of the Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 GEO. L.J.
1371 (1986). This suggests an additional fault line within criminal law as
presently practiced (a fault line roughly corresponding to the distinction between
mala in se and mala prohibita offenses) which separates offenses rooted in a
moral concern to secure human dignity from those rooted in the imperatives of
governance in a modern society. That a given level of blameworthiness is
intrinsic to the wrong sought to be prevented by core offenses does not however
entail that the same level of blameworthiness must be required for conviction:
for purposes of deterrence, the law may cast a wider net. So even here,
refraining from doing so, and insisting on a robust requirement of guilt,
represents considerations associated with deontological constraints.
41
Courts are sometimes required to decide whether a form of government
deprivation not explicitly labeled as punishment is in fact punitive and so subject
to criminal law’s strictures. For example, in concluding that the revocation of
citizenship is indeed punitive, the criteria enumerated by the Supreme Court
include:
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The remaining step to our destination is short. Punishing the
corporation involves no one’s mistreatment. None of the
shareholders or other stakeholders who are made worse off by the
corporate sanction is personally singled out for a deliberate
deprivation. Consequently, the effects of corporate sanctions on
shareholders and other individuals do not carry the invidious
message of disrespect that mistreating them would have. For this
reason, the corporate veil not only hides but morally shelters
individuals from the effects of corporate punishment. The resulting
individual deprivations must, of course, be taken into account in
designing the system of corporate criminal liability. But the role
that these side-effects should play in our deliberations lacks the
special urgency present when the mistreatment of individuals is at
stake.
IV. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
Nothing I have said in this paper bears on the desirable level of
government control of corporate behavior or on the best means of
exercising such control. I have made two related, but different
points. One is that the corporation is a suitable object for the

[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it . . . .
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963). (For a slight
variation of these criteria, see Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361–63
(1997)). Some of the Court’s criteria correspond to elements in my notion of
mistreatment. Where the two sets of criteria diverge, some doubts about the
Court’s criteria come to mind, e.g., whether the deprivation has historically been
regarded as a punishment appears uninformative (why was it so regarded in the
first place?), and whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter has
things backward (if it is punitive it better be based on a finding of scienter,
rather than the other way round). In any case, the notion of mistreatment gives
the determination of punitiveness a unified theoretical basis in a way that the
Court’s criteria do not.
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imposition of sanctions.42 Second, insofar as the imposition of
sanctions is deemed desirable, it need not be hampered by the same
constraints as those that tie the government’s hands when dealing
directly with individuals. This dual conclusion has wider
repercussions, within criminal law and beyond. Let me end by
briefly indicating what they are.
The further repercussion relating to criminal law was
foreshadowed earlier in the paper when I mentioned various ways
other than the distinction between sanction and constraint in which
criminal law can be disaggregated. This implies potentially
additional ways in which the treatment of corporations within what
we broadly conceive as the criminal law can be custom tailored to
suit them in distinction from the treatment due to individuals.
Exploring these possibilities might eventually lead to a two-track
system, with the tracks differing along the substantive, procedural,
and evidentiary dimensions. These tracks need not, however, end
at the boundary of criminal law. The considerations that shape
them pertain to other legal areas as well, suggesting a two-track
legal system throughout.43 Though some steps in this direction
have already been taken, they are spotty and sporadic.44 The
present climate of heightened awareness toward corporations and
their social role perhaps offers an opportunity for a more openminded and resolute willingness to rethink the law’s attitude
toward them across the board, and contemplate the intellectual and
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This does not of course tell us when, if ever, the imposition of sanctions
is warranted, or how it compares with other strategies of control.
43
For an early precursor of a line of thought pointing in this general
direction, see generally CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE
SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975).
44
For example, numerous laws tie various special obligations to corporate
size. See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601–
2654 (West 2010) (tying the right to take a leave of absence to care for certain
family members to employees of corporations with fifty or more employees);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 2009) (limiting the Act’s
prohibition on employment discrimination to companies that employ fifteen or
more employees); cf. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116
Stat. 745 (West 2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
(imposing disclosure and auditing requirements upon publicly traded
corporations).
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institutional transformations that might be required.45
Finally, the considerations canvassed in this paper stand for an
even broader claim, that the corporate economy opens up an area
in which the government has greater moral leeway than when its
coercive power is brought to bear directly on individuals.
Interposing an intermediate entity between the government and its
citizens blunts some of the moral edge of coercion and mitigates
the threat it otherwise poses to individuals’ dignity and their
autonomy. This has two complementary implications. One is that
in dealing with corporations, the government may legitimately
pursue social goals more aggressively than when dealing with
individuals.46 The second implication is that the greater moral
license the government enjoys in regard to corporations may
bolster the government’s circumspection in regard to individuals.
The underlying suggestion is that whenever feasible, and other
things being equal,47 the government shift its coercive powers from
individuals to corporations, letting the latter serve as the preferred
vehicles for attaining its policy objectives. Shifting in this way the
brunt of government action from individuals to corporations may
provide a way of promoting the social interest with a reduced
moral toll.

45

However, the suggested approach has recently suffered a severe setback
in Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 912–13 (2010), in
which the Supreme Court reversed previous decisions that had limited corporate
First Amendment protections. I address some of these broader issues in MEIR
DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR
BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986).
46
But here again, moral license is one thing; sound policy that is consonant
with it is another. How active the government should be in its dealings with
corporations and what forms that activity should take are distinctly policy
matters which lie entirely outside my present discussion.
47
Which of course they never are; so this proposal is put forward not as a
program for action, but as food for reflection.

